“The situation is potentially worse in the Sahel-Sahara, where cocaine is arriving by the ton. There it is fed into well-established overland trafficking routes across the Sahara where government influence is limited and where factions of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb have become increasingly active.

The group, previously known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, is raising millions of dollars from the kidnap of Europeans. Analysts say militants strike deals of convenience with Tuareg rebels and smugglers of arms, cigarettes and drugs. According to a growing pattern of evidence, the group may now be deriving hefty revenues from facilitating the smuggling of FARC-made cocaine to the shores of Europe.”

“Marginalised by their governments; ignored by the international community and deprived by the GWOT of their livelihoods, but still skilled fighters, the question now being asked is whether the Tuareg, especially in Mali, where the AQIM presence is greatest, will attempt to take matters into their own hands.”

“It is easy to over state the “control” of a non-state actor in northern Mali or Niger if other important factors are not considered. AQIM does not “control” vast swathes of territory anymore than Tuareg factions or states do. Control is about the ability to quickly project force over a necessary distance. The Sahara’s geography makes this difficult, though not impossible for actors projecting from the outside. States and non-state actors have areas of operations in the Sahara more than they zones of control.”